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Introduction   
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a developing financial centre located in the 
Persian Gulf. Its economic development, political stability, and business environment 
has attracted an influx of people and international capital in recent years. However, 
due to its geographic location and ‘liberal’ business laws and trade ‘relationships’ 
with other Gulf States, east Africa, and south Asia, and its expanding trade with 
Balkan states, the UAE has the potential to be a major conduit for money laundering 
(Overman, Redding and Venables, 2003). Furthermore, due to its close proximity to 
Afghanistan, where most of the world's opium is produced, the UAE is vulnerable to 
organised crime and terrorism and the narcotics trade. All of these criminal elements 
are attracted to the UAE financial liberal business environment (Blanchard, 2009, 
2009).  
Following the September 11 attacks in the United States, however, and amid 
revelations that money had been moved via the UAE to help fund the attack, the UAE 
imposed a freeze on the known funds of organisations with links to terrorism, 
including Al-Barakat, which was then based in Dubai. Since 2001, the UAE, at 
federal and emirate-level has put in place a far more comprehensive system to prevent 
and reduce money laundering. Two acts serve as the foundation for anti-money 
laundering (AML) in the UAE; these are the Anti-Money Laundering Law (2002) and 
Counter Terrorism Law (2004) (See IMF, 2009). Therefore, since 2002 onwards the 
UAE has developed procedures, processes and laws to combat money laundering. 
There has, however, been little or no assessment of these laws, procedures and 
processes effectiveness in preventing and reducing money laundering in the UAE.  It 
is these issues which this paper addresses.   
We therefore review the current practices and strategies employed in the UAE to 
combat money laundering. This is then followed with the key issues we encountered 
undertaking research in the financial sector and police in Dubai.  The results from our 
work are then presented. These are broken down into relevant sections reflecting the 
content obtained in the interviews; these are factors encouraging money laundering in 
the UAE, know your customer policy, the investigation of cases and arrests and 
cooperation and information sharing. Finally there is a discussion of the key issues 
raised by this research.  
As Levi noted (1996:3), however, finding an effective regulatory regime for 
the financial world is problematic. ‘The trick of regulation is to minimise the 
illegitimate exploitation without wrecking economic dynamism’. This is applicable to 
the UAE as elsewhere.    
 
 
Anti-money laundering in the UAE 
 
Although the United Arab Emirates has recognised, and is currently responding to, the 
continued challenges that are posed by increasingly well-resourced and organised 
international crime networks (Schulte-Bockholt, 2006; Wing Lo, 2010), the rate at 
which its anti-money laundering systems, and processes are followed remains a 
challenge both at the strategic and implementation levels. Due to the relative 
autonomy of individual emirates within the UAE, however, there are different 
approaches to anti money laundering enforcement. Furthermore, the approach to 
preventing money laundering in the UAE reflects the official approach often 
associated with the USA, which is that globalisation has permitted the accumulation 
of immeasurable sums of illegal money originating in illegal international markets 
(United Nations 1988; FATF 1990), and that such wealth is now so vast that moving a 
fraction of it may pose a systemic danger for the strongly interconnected international 
financial system (Tanzi 1996) and that illegal income is somehow different to 
legitimate income and thus ‘performs’ in a different way when placed into the 
officially recognized financial sector (i.e., it forces the official financial system to 
alter prices, interest and exchange rates, and leads to unfair competition (Tanzi 1996; 
Steinko, 2012) in legitimate international financial markets. None of these conjectures 
is, however, yet empirically corroborated. But these conjectures are what Dubai has 
based its system of prevention on. This research suggests that most of the quantitative 
and qualitative assumptions on the money laundering are partly, if not, mostly 
incorrect (see Reuter and Truman 2004; Levi and Reuter, 2006; Steinko, 2012).  
Regardless, the UAE established a National Anti-Money Laundering 
Committee (NAMLC) responsible for coordinating anti-money laundering policy 
across and within the different emirates. It is chaired by the governor of the Central 
Bank, with representatives from the Ministries of Interior, Justice, Finance, and 
Economy; the National Customs Board; the Secretary General of the Municipalities; 
the Federation of the Chambers of Commerce; and five major banks and money 
exchange houses; these latter members, however, are allowed access as observers and 
only when policy is discussed. The penalty for breaking NAMLC regulations ranges 
from fines to imprisonment on officers, employees and managers of financial 
institutions that fall short of reporting suspected money laundering. However, the 
NAMLC is also able to offer immunity from criminal prosecution, civil or 
administrative action if correct procedures were followed.  
Furthermore, the establishment of the Anti-Money Laundering and Suspicious 
Cases Unit (AMLSCU) in the UAE was aimed at investigating fraud and associated 
suspicious transactions. Established by the Anti-Money Laundering Act 2002 and 
designed to enhance the actions of the UAE Central Bank, which aims at supporting 
international attempts to combat money laundering as well as the financing of 
terrorism, it is considered as the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) of the Central Bank 
and is charged with examining and coordinating the release of information to law 
enforcement and judicial bodies – this expected coordination, however, is yet to be 
achieved (see research section).   
The AMLSCU further exchanges information with international FIU and since 
December 2000, the Central Bank has referred 108 cases to international FIUs. From 
December 2000 to December 2005, the AMLSCU has received and investigated 3031 
suspicious transactions reports (STRs) and from December 2004 to December 2005 
alone, the AMLSCU received and investigated 772 STRs. No freeze orders were 
issued in 2005 based on STR submissions, but from December 2000 to December 
2005, the Central Bank has issued 27 freeze orders based on AMLSCU and law 
enforcement investigations. Twelve of these cases are in process with prosecution 
planned for money laundering and confiscation of all illegal proceeds. Since 2000, the 
Central Bank has frozen (US dollars) $1,348,381 in 17 different accounts. 
 However, the problem of preventing money laundering in the UAE is 
compounded by cash based sectors. Gold and diamonds, especially in the markets in 
Dubai, are extremely vulnerable to money laundering. Aware of this problem, the 
UAE has participated in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough 
Diamonds (KPCS) since November 2002. The certification process is under the 
control of the Dubai Metals and Commodities Center (DMCC), a quasi-governmental 
organisation that employs four individuals full-time to administer the programme to 
estimate 50-diamond traders in Dubai  
The UAE has also become sensitive to organisations claiming charitable status 
as well, with fears that these are fronts for terrorist organisation/cells. It therefore 
change the law that all licensed charities interested in transferring funds overseas must 
do so via one of three umbrella organizations: the Red Crescent Authority, the Zayed 
Charitable Foundation, or the Muhammad Bin Rashid Charitable Trust. These three 
quasi-governmental bodies are in a position to ensure that overseas financial transfers 
are sent to a legitimate, recognised party. As an additional step, a list of recognised 
acceptable recipients for UAE charitable assistance is compiled by the state.   
Furthermore, the Free Trade Zones (FTZs) and Financial Free Zones (FFZs) in 
the UAE also compound the problem of anti-money laundering. With 17 FTZ already 
in operation and plans to establish eleven more, the potential for money laundering is 
high. Every emirate except Abu Dhabi has at least one functioning FTZ and these 
zones are monitored at emirate, as opposed to federal-level. However, there are over a 
hundred multinationals located in these FTZs, with thousands of individual trading 
organisations. The FTZs permit 100 percent foreign ownership, no import duties, full 
repatriation of capital and profits, no taxation, and easily obtainable licenses.  Those 
located in the FTZ are treated as offshore or outside the UAE for legal purposes. 
However, UAE law prohibits the establishments of a shell company and/or trusts, and 
does not permit non-residents to open bank accounts in the UAE.  
In September 2004, the UAE also established its first financial free zone 
(FFZ), known as the Dubai International Financial Center (DIFC). The FFZs are 
exempt UAE federal civil and commercial laws. They are still, however, subject to the 
Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Law. The DIFC established an 
independent regulatory body - the Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA), which 
reports to the office of Dubai Crown Prince and an independent Commercial Court. 
The DFSA is the only authority responsible for licensing firms providing financial 
services in the DIFC.  
The DFSA has licensed 21 financial institutions and 13 ancillary services 
within the DIFC. The DFSA's rules prohibit offshore casinos or Internet gaming sites 
in the UAE, and require all firms to send STR to the AMLSCU (along with a copy to 
the DFSA). Although firms operating in the DIFC are subject to anti-money 
laundering laws, the DFSA issued its own anti-money laundering regulations and 
supervisory regime, creating some ambiguity as to the authority of the Central Bank 
and AMLSCU within the DIFC.  
To prevent and/or reduce the incidence of money laundering is difficult to 
achieve. However, with predominantly cased-based economy, different emirates 
competing for business, free trade zones and different supervisor regimes in financial 
sectors the problem is only multiplied. This is highlighted in the interviews. However, 
before we present the information discovered by our research a review of the key 
issues we encountered trying to obtain this information is needed to explain the 
context and environment in which the research occurred.                  
 
 
Researching in Dubai: Methodological Issues  
 
Due to the nature of this research a combination of methods were used; a semi-
structured interview schedule with 5 sections was designed that focussed on 
preventing money laundering in Dubai. The 30 respondents interviewed included 10 
people working in the financial sector, 10 officials from the AMLSCU and 10 Dubai 
police officers working in the Anti-Organised Crime Department (AOCD). There was 
little response from Central Bank of Dubai personnel originally, however, further 
communication was sent via a personal contact to secure access to potential 
interviewees. The methods used were therefore a combination of a semi-structured 
interview schedule and a snowball sample (Mason, 1996; see also Moloney et al, 
2009 and Mason and Pulvirenti, 2013) and direct and negotiated access.  
The personal contact that helped with the negotiated access worked in the 
police and has contacts within the financial sector. Access to such people and their 
social networks and set of contacts (Thomson, 1997) is a delicate matter. This process 
is based on the assumption that a ‘bond’ or ‘link’ exists between the initial sample and 
point of contact and that others in the same social population, allow a series of 
referrals to be made within a circle of acquaintances (Berg, 1988; Broadhead and Rist, 
1976, Brooks, 2012). Furthermore, in this case one of the researchers was from a 
similar social and cultural background to those interviewed; this helped secure access 
under which this research was conducted but also raised some methodological and 
ethical issues (Farooq and Brooks, 2013). While a snowball sample is to some extent 
limited, it is, however, often used for those ‘hard to reach’ research subjects such as 
‘elites’ (Atkinson and Flint, 2001) and it was thought appropriate to approach a 
personal contact to ‘sound out’ the possibility of interviewing people employed in the 
Central Bank, if they were, and thought that other ‘colleagues’ in this sector were 
willing to respond to questions on matters of money laundering in Dubai.  
This research produced some interesting results and provided some 
explorative, qualitative and descriptive data. While it is beneficial to have a personal 
contact as a ‘gatekeeper’ it can, however, influence the direction and sample of the 
research in a number of ways; they can limit access and conditions of entry in a social 
community, limit access to people and data and restrict the scope of analysis (Bulmer, 
2003, Brooks, 2012). In this research it was felt appropriate that one of the research 
team conduct all the interviews, which could be in Arabic and/or English, or a 
combination of the two, as this researcher is multi-lingual and aware of the cultural 
roles in this context. 
To access key personnel, it was agreed that the interview schedule would be 
sent to all potential interviewees before an interview could be arranged. While this no 
doubt affected the interview and the data we obtained, it was necessary to access and 
interview our respondents. There are, however, problems with this approach; i.e., 
prepared statements by the respondent, a lack of ‘fluid’ conversation and an 
organisational view rather than that of the respondent (Brooks, 2012; Farooq and 
Brooks, 2013). This approach, however, was necessary as we were informed, 
particularly by our ‘gatekeeper’ that no interviews would be forthcoming without 
showing ‘respect’ in our respondents positions, and a willingness to be ‘open’ in our 
research objectives and ‘faith’ in our respondents to answer questions honestly.        
Once the interview schedule was checked by our respondents it was made 
clear, however, that the only some of the questions would be answered, as others were 
of a ‘sensitive nature’ and they were unable or unwilling to respond to them. None of 
the interviews were recorded as requested by the respondents; however due to the 
nature of the work of the people interviewed and some of the legal and commercial 
interests involved, this was also understandable. Therefore, it was difficult to commit 
full attention to the interview and some of the more subtle elements of the interviews 
were lost (Bell, 2005). Rather than assume ‘understanding’ from the notes some of 
them were returned to the relevant individual to clarify all elements of the cases 
mentioned in the interviews were correct.  
 The UAE has developed rapidly and as such its international legal system and 
controls are in the process of adjusting to international commerce. Even though laws 
were passed years ago, it is in the process of developing a clear anti-money 
laundering strategy putting pressure on the financial sector to implement and tighten 
controls on the transfer of funds within and across jurisdictions to comply with 
international laws and conventions the UAE has signed. This process of updating laws 
and controls, however, is ongoing and in this sense the UAE and Dubai in particular, 
is no different to other jurisdictions. The context in which the interviews were 
secured, however, reflected the results below, as anti-money laundering is presently a 
sensitive political issue in the UAE as some of its geographical neighbours are 
experiencing social disorder, with suspected flights of capital to a close-by financial 
safe haven sharing a similar cultural background.  
The subsequent five sections from our interview schedule illustrate this current 
context in which the police and financial institutions ‘work’ in Dubai and the pending 
issues in need of attention. 
 
Factors Encouraging Money Laundering in the UAE 
 
The problem with money laundering in the UAE, as expressed by our respondents, is 
that it is seen as more of an external cause by others – individuals and nations -rather 
than an internal issue. The factors presently contributing to this is the political 
instability of the region.  While the UAE has remained calm and settled other 
neighbouring nations have experienced unrest and turmoil. In this context those with 
legal and/or illegal funds seek a route to transfer money to a stable, and close-by, 
country that is easy to reach and travel to without the need for a visa.   
As one senior executive in the financial sector said ‘you know any cross-border 
transactions incoming and outgoing with Afghanistan, Iraq, some African states and 
others would raise suspicion. It is very hard for us to decide on the legality of these 
funds. It is impossible to say if there is no money laundering from other places, which 
do not have any internal conflicts or what you called them: developed states’. He 
further went on to say, and contradict himself, ‘we don’t have any organised crime 
here in the UAE. However, the UAE, being one of the important financial centres, has 
always been on the list of these organised criminals in order to launder their money’.  
There appeared to be a consensus of opinion in the financial sector and AMLSCU 
officials, however, that ‘black money’ enters the UAE as a result of two main 
organised criminal activities: illicit drugs and arms smuggling. It was reluctantly 
admitted by the police in particular that due to its geographical location and diverse 
population that ‘there are chances that these criminals bring their illegal money to the 
UAE to launder it through our banking or Hawala system’.  
Preventing money laundering is also an integrity issue, and as one respondent 
indicated:  ‘Yes…It is difficult to determine the source of the funds sometimes due to 
the instability of the country from which they came and lack of proof of the source of 
the funds’. This problem, yet again, is not one peculiar to the UAE; it is one that 
plagues the international financial system (Alldridge, 2008, Levi, 2007, Levi and 
Reuter, 2006).  
 
 
The ‘Know Your Customer’ Policy 
 
All those interviewed where keen to point out that there is no ‘hard and fast rule’ in 
spotting money laundering. Each case has to be approach based on the existing 
evidence available. After all, even if a case of money laundering, it will be unclear at 
what stage in the process it would be. Therefore, those interviewed were cautious 
about identifying an account early on as one that had used laundered funds and 
proceeded with caution. Once a customer has established a ‘pattern’ it is easier to 
track a customers’ behaviour. Evidence then is both the knowledge and data on 
customers’ interests and the ability to review account information and unusual 
activity.  
This ‘real time’ assessment of transactions, if used correctly, helps expose some 
potential frauds. This communication of ‘evidence,’ however, is also a problem.  Due 
to the established approaches to preventing money laundering substantial information 
is passed on and processed. Information is coming from computerised notification, 
personal contacts and external sources etc. The Know Your Customer regime has thus 
evolved into a set of precautionary measures involving reassessment of client 
accounts based on a gathering of information for differing sources of credibility (Gill 
and Taylor, 2002, 2003, 2004).   
One respondent described the process of ‘knowing your customer’ by explaining 
that ‘from our new clients, we ask them to produce a copy of their passport, a driving 
license, their employment status and the company for which they work, and any other 
documents that show their name, date of birth, nationality [and so on]. To what extent 
these documents are real or forged, we don’t know, especially in the case of non-UAE 
documents’.  
It was clearly the case amongst many in the financial sector that procedures were 
followed more as a ‘defensible decision’ (Kemshall, 1999) or ‘defendable 
compliance’ (Ericson, 2006). One respondent interviewed simply said ‘we play by the 
rules of the game’. I can understand if someone lower down {meaning below 
executive level} passed everything on as a way to protect his self’. He won’t want to 
be blamed if some piece of information that he did not pass on is found out to be 
important in a case later on.        
Furthermore, a different respondent in the financial sector suggested that ‘some 
bank managers argue that the competition amongst banks to attract customers has 
meant that the verification of a client’s documents is sometimes not as thorough as it 
should be…and we can’t know the intention of the person who wishes to open a bank 
account. It could be an ordinary person’. Some financial managers accepted that the 
system is not totally free of corruption, in spite of the provisions put in place to ensure 
that transactions are properly recorded. 
Two key important issues further developed from this part of the interview 
schedule. Due to the vast wealth of some of the people that used the financial sector in 
Dubai it was suggested that some transactions were briefly reviewed. This ‘light-
touch’ approach, however, is something that can be levelled at the financial sector 
elsewhere i.e., Nat West Bank in United Kingdom and lead to money laundering. In 
addition there was some concern from the police in particular about Political Exposed 
Persons (PEP). As one respondent said ‘we know there are some people that bank 
here that are involved in illegal activity but some of the banks don’t seem to mind.’ 
This view echo’s Gill’s and Taylor’s (2004) where ‘Know Your Customer’ rules can 
have negative implications and alienate established customers. 
There are conflicting views then between those representing law enforcement 
bodies and those in the financial sector; the financial sector tended to play down the 
level of corruption whilst law enforcement bodies were aware of some corruption but 
limited in what could be done without the necessary evidence.          
Furthermore, requests for information on customers, particularly from policing 
bodies encountered obstacles. This, however, is not clear if the financial sector was 
obstructive or disorganised or both in some cases.  However, the financial sector was 
aware of the role that it had to play in identifying potential money laundering, but the 
procedure for identifying high-risk accounts is an ongoing process, applied to new 
and existing customers. Any transaction that is not compatible with the economic 
status of the customer is considered suspicious and is reported by financial institutions 
to the Central Bank for further investigation. However, there was no indication that 
the amount of money was a key element in the decision regarding a transaction as 
suspicious. One respondent made it clear by saying that ‘a suspicious transaction has 
nothing to do with its amount. I know the common sense approach lead us to believe 
that any big transaction could be suspicious, which is wrong. The criminals are very 
clever and they know that bank officials will monitor any big transaction’.  
 
 
The Investigation of Cases and Arrests  
 
The financial sector respondents felt that they were part of the solution rather than the 
problem and willingly worked with the criminal justice system, if required. They were 
keen to also emphasise that it is not in the interests of the financial sector to be party 
to money laundering. Therefore, the respondents were vociferous in defence of the 
financial sector, which would be expected, but produced a sound, logical case, that if 
they had a vested interest, if at all, it was to see banks as honest and trustworthy to 
attract customers.  
It was also suggested that the police needed to do more regarding the ‘policing’ of 
money laundering. This was particularly the case when provided with overwhelming 
information from the banks that suspicious activity had occurred regarding an event. 
Often it was felt that some type of investigation would be useful, but as was pointed 
out by one police respondent the ‘banks’ did not always seem keen to expose 
corruption in their business and so were vocally supportive but official obstructive. 
This, though, is similar to other business sectors that discover internal frauds 
(Cunningham, 2004; Levi, 1987; Brooks et al, 2013).  
Furthermore, everyone interviewed agreed on the necessity of contributing to the 
struggle to prevent money laundering, organised crime and terrorism, however, 
opinion differed on the ‘small-scale ’misappropriation of funds with no clear view 
from either law enforcement or the financial sector. In addition views diverged on the 
emphasis of punishment and persuasion as part of a regulatory regime (see 
Braithwaite, 1990). Law enforcement preferred unsurprisingly punishment to deter 
future acts whilst those in the financial sector suggested a more light-touch approach 
to wayward acts and actors. As illustrated elsewhere, getting the right balance is 
weighed down with practical problems (Braithwaite, 1993, Croall, 1992, Levi, 1987).         
Developing a sound case of money laundering, however, is difficult, particularly if 
a successful arrest is to be made and subsequent conviction. One police officer 
explained ‘first gather information and then continue to build the criminal case based 
upon your initial investigation. Our job is to start looking for the mistakes they have 
made to find foolproof evidence; it is not an easy job, honestly’. The police officers 
interviewed found it more convenient to focus on the criminal element of the crime, in 
other words, to ascertain that the suspect has indeed committed the crime. The 
majority of police officers said that the financial aspect of the money laundering was 
of less concern to them than the criminality of the act itself.  
Thus, whilst accepting the relevance of effective laws to prevent money 
laundering, many of the officers said that this should be complemented by a better 
system of criminal investigation in which police officers are trained in, and able to 
use, more sophisticated methods of criminal and financial investigation. Some of the 
police officers also mentioned, as a very important hindrance to an effective money 
laundering investigation, the fact that the Dubai Police do not have access to all 
financial data and information. As suggested, ‘if the Dubai Police is given direct 
access to the database of STRs and CTRs, it will improve our efforts in fighting 
organised crime… and money laundering in particular’. However, many of the 
respondents said that the transfer of cases from the AMLSCU to the Attorney General 
and the Public Prosecutor and then onto the police takes far too long for a case to 
reach it conclusion.  
Furthermore, even when knowingly victimised, individuals and organisations fail 
to report money laundering and other acts. An individual may feel embarrassed and 
fail to report the crime; an organisation might investigate in-house and decide that it 
would be best to resolve the matter internally, even though a crime has been 
committed, to protect its public reputation, rather than open a ‘Pandora’s box’ (Levi, 
2002) and expose the level and depth of corruption in their company.  
The police respondents recognised, however, that some institutions had 
considered the problem of money laundering and were trying to ‘do something’ about 
it. These organisations, however, appeared to have had little success, and acted ‘after 
the event’ rather than prevent it, which is necessary to protect the integrity of 
business. The problem, however, appears to be one of integrity within some financial 
institutions as one part of the tripartite structure – legal framework, private financial 
sector and police - needed to work together to help prevent/reduce money laundering.  
When asked ‘do you find it easy to discover money laundering, and arrest 
suspects’, an AMLSCU representative suggested that there is ‘a general consensus of 
opinion amongst the bank managers and the AMLSCU officials that money 
laundering is not an easy crime to detect. Criminals use different tactics in order to 
hide the true origin of black money’.  
However, the respondents from all sectors interviewed were aware that the UAE 
is committed to sharing financial information with its overseas partners in order to 
strengthen mutual cooperation to prevent money laundering and the financing of 
terrorism. The AMLSCU were particularly aware though, that criminal elements were 
taking full advantage of the cash-based economy in the UAE to launder money in the 
region. One respondent made it perfectly clear when they said ‘If, for example, a 
person suddenly becomes rich without having any proper business or employment, 
there is no mechanism in place to ascertain the source of that person’s money’. It was 
further believed that criminals are also taking advantage of the weak immigration 
control systems increasing the problem of policing a growing illegal population and 
cash payments and transfers via the Hawala system (Levi, 2010).   
Pursued on the matter of how they would arrest someone investigated for money 
laundering, the police generally agreed on the complex nature of this process. All 
agreed that money laundering is a different and unique type of crime; it varies from 
one case to another depending upon the nature of the case. In some cases one 
respondent said, ‘we arrest people on the spot, whereas in other cases we have to 
search homes, offices [and so on]. In some cases, we do not even manage to arrest the 
accused person for years. All the officers agreed that, ‘generally, cases referred to 
them via the Customs Authority are easier to handle than cases that have come via the 
AMLSCU’, as suspects in former cases could be arrested immediately at the port of 
entry. 
The only available information, however from the Dubai police released by the 
Director of Investigation was from 2002, with 16 cases associated with money 
laundering reported to relevant authorities. Nonetheless, some of the cases are still 
pending as they require detailed investigation years after they were discovered.  
 
 
Cooperation and Information Sharing 
 
It was also suggested by those working for police institutions that the financial sector 
needed to do more regarding the ‘policing’ of money laundering. This was 
particularly the case when provided with overwhelming information from the Anti-
Money Laundering Suspicion Cases Unit (AMLSCU) that suspicious activity 
regarding transactions had occurred regarding an event.  
The role of the AMLSCU was made clear from one respondent: ‘we receive 
suspicious cases and we study the situation and if there is any inquiry, we notify the 
bank. And if it is proved that the transaction is illegitimate, we notify prosecutors and 
police and establish procedures to prove evidence to the court’.  
 This sharing of information and communication is a necessary part of the 
system of preventing money laundering. All of the respondents interviewed agreed 
that without ‘sound’ information and clear channels of communication the UAE 
leaves itself open to money laundering, particularly from some of its neighbouring 
cash-based nations and those with a reputation for corruption. A few of the 
respondents named specific states and some even specific regions of a country as 
problematic. However, no evidence was forthcoming to substantiate these claims, and 
as such, it was decided keep such information anonymous rather than speculate on the 
personal judgement of a few respondents.  
This communication, however, is a dual exchange of information. For example, 
one respondent from the AMLSCU made it clear how important the financial sector is 
in preventing money laundering. It is not a role the ‘police and law enforcement’ 
bodies can achieve unless cooperation is forthcoming’. As one officer said ‘we 
receive information from the banks because they are the backbone of all business in 
the state… we also receive suspicious cases from exchange houses, and from public 
or private enterprises…receiving reports from all financial, commercial and 
economic development in the state’.  
However, one respondent from AMLSCU said that ‘all…operating in the country, 
whether commercial or industrial…if suspect suspicious transactions must notify the 
Central Bank of suspicious cases…but they tend to receive information from the 
private sector once an issue is exposed and gets publicity’. 
 These competing views were typical of the interviews where personal 
experience and contacts made a difference on the question of communication and 
information sharing.  It appears that a system of communication needs to move 
beyond its informal system of information sharing to one of a more formal and 
standardise system. There was no concern about the use of technology and the spread 
of what is referred as to ‘soft security’, ‘dataveillance’ or ‘surveillance (See Levi and 
Wall (2004) and Lyon (2006) in either sector, however. This is perhaps because the 
informal system is part of the cultural context of Dubai. It was made clear, however, 
that ‘this system is not available to everyone’. There appears to be two present 
systems running parallel depending on customer; the formal or informal.    
One Dubai police officer made his views clear when claiming that ‘it is not easy 
to find evidence in a money laundering case because criminals have thought about the 
way of hiding money from us. So we need to access to bank records or any financial 
information but there is too much trouble in the investigation to obtain and swap 
records’. Most tellingly ‘he added you cannot fight money laundering effectively by 
introducing laws alone. You need effective implementation of the law’. 
Furthermore, an AMLSCU official said, ‘the facts that the police are not trained 
in the investigation of financial data do not have expertise in understanding banking 
records. However, they {the banks} would never welcome the police coming to them 
and asking for their clients’ records. It does not give a good impression of the bank’. 
The majority of the interviews ended on a positive note, however, with many 
saying it is, ‘my responsibility to share information or SARs if relevant’. Money 
laundering as a crime could possibility be used against us (as a country). I believe 
that sharing of information would help our department and solve and combat money 
laundering. But we need to give each department chance to do fulfil their objectives in 
the way that helps investigation to bring the cases to justice’.  
 
 
Key Issues: Building Strategies for the Future     
 
As with all research there are limitations to what it achieves. This research is no 
different. Firstly, interviews are sometimes time consuming as they require careful 
preparation, such as making the necessary arrangement(s) to visit premises and 
confirming and keeping appointments and securing the necessary permission 
(Robson, 1993).  Secondly, the main problem encountered in the interviews was that 
so many of the respondents were busy and had limited time available. This was 
because many important cases are pending and as such time was limited.  The 
interviews were, however, valuable, and it was important to interview a broad section 
of people involved in preventing money laundering in Dubai rather than from one 
agency. The final and perhaps most contentious part of the interviews was interview 
bias with one of our team a Captain in the Dubai Police. This, however, is a problem 
for all research which can affect the outcome from access, interview to final data 
obtained. Whilst this is a problem, this research would not have been possible without 
one member of the team from a similar cultural background in a position to access the 
respondents.    
There was also the problem of analysis and examination of secondary data such as 
official crime statistics and cases of money laundering in the UAE, which was 
limited. This in turn affected the basis for interviews with key personnel in the 
AMLSCU, AOCD and Central Bank, in order to evaluate to what extent the 
prevention of money laundering is to be enhanced in the UAE. This included 
examining whether the current system is ‘fit for purpose’ in the age of international 
trade and commerce.  
However, the rate/percentage of money laundered is difficult if not impossible to 
assess. As illustrated by the percentage of money coming from the proceeds of 
wholesale illegal narcotics trade that actually gets laundered is a multiple of the sum 
that has been confiscated, and the value of that multiple depends on how efficiently 
anti-laundering regime confiscates illegal money (Steinko, 2012).  
Furthermore, money launderers do not always use the legal banking system. If 
they do it has been established that they purchase fiscally opaque products, meant to 
secure future medical coverage and personal pension plans.  Only a marginal portion 
of the financial assets is assigned to speculative financial risk (van Duyne and Levi 
2005) in the legal system with laundered money used elsewhere illustrated (i.e., gold 
market). This research, similar to other research (Steinko, 2012) confirmed that 
money launders and productive legal financial sector sometimes have very little in 
common and that launderers prefer to place money in a shell company with no 
activity to those that are formally capable of developing a regular productive business 
activity. The problem of competition in legal banking sector was also a concern raised 
by a few police officers: ‘in the search for more money, profits, these banks will not 
always do what is necessary and tell us what is happening with some accounts.    
The problem encountered in this research is that most of the secondary data was 
either withheld for security reasons i.e. ongoing cases or private considerations i.e. 
protecting integrity of own company, which is understandable or, and this was the 
most common theme, there is little available data on money laundering in the UAE, 
which needs to be addressed. What data was obtained was nonetheless still helpful but 
it is suggested that recording practices need some attention before we can tackle the 
problem of money laundering from a policy-type-approach to disseminate practice 
within and across different sectors in the UAE that deal with money laundering.  Data, 
and particularly criminal justice data is, however, open to criticism (Box, 1983, 
Bulmer, 1984 and Jupp, 1989) and acts of fraud and corruption are difficult to detect 
(Slapper and Tombs, 1999; Brooks et al 2009, Brooks et al, 2013). 
Regardless of this problem, however, some understanding of the level of money 
laundering – even if an estimate - in a certain domain is important. From this research 
it would appear that to varying extents and in various ways money laundering could 
be, but was rarely assessed (both directly and indirectly) for its prevalence at 
particular moments, as well as over periods of time. It is still doubtful, however, as to 
what extent assessments reflect the level of money laundering. There is also similar 
disquiet regarding the effectiveness of anti-money laundering measures due to its 
multi-dimensional character.  In the UAE efforts have been undertaken to prevent and 
reduce money laundering. There is, however, little official data, as yet, that illustrates 
that this is happening. This research is a contribution to this ‘gap in knowledge’ in 
highlighting the paucity of data that needs to be addressed in the UAE.  
However, a lack of official data is not a problem that is specific to the UAE, it is a 
worldwide problem. Objective ‘criminal’ data is difficult to obtain, either on a 
national or international level. One of the problems of drawing on secondary data then 
is trying to gather international comparison of money laundering with initiatives that 
do not take into account the variations that exist in the world of international finance 
(Brooks et al, 2013). In saying this we hope that this original research is step in the 
right direction in producing some background to present strategies in preventing 
money laundering in Dubai.     
Furthermore, it was discovered that in Dubai, new forms of exchange found 
elsewhere in Europe, USA etc. instituting a joint form of surveillance - the financial 
sector and law enforcement - is hardly developed in Dubai.  It was as one respondent 
said ‘work in progress’. Elsewhere the hybridization of money laundering with public 
and private sector connections (i.e., police work in financial sector) is also absent in 
Dubai. Here there is a clear demarcation of roles. However, communication between 
sectors is on more of an informal, familial basis than official, and personal, familial 
contacts keep the flow of information going. A respondent did, however, raise the 
issue that the internationalisation of the financial sector is ‘leading to a stage where 
informal and personal contacts were becoming less important as people from outside 
{other cultures} were increasingly employed’. 
 A telling final difference we discovered is that the homogenisation of procedures 
such as training, network exchange and the use of information technology where not 
always so obvious. These procedures were in place but perhaps because of the cultural 
context and personal, familial networks that are part of ‘Dubai life’ had not reached 
the stage of homogenisation highlighted in previous research (Favarel-Garrigues, 
Godefroy and Lascoumes, 2008). This, however, is something that is changing.  
This paper then is a snapshot of current strategies to tackle money laundering in 
Dubai. Many issues were highlighted with some – sharing information and 
professional communication – perhaps in need of immediate attention. However, we 
are aware that legislative and cultural changes are slow regardless of the jurisdiction. 
There is also a fear that the cultural context and ‘way we do it here‘ is lost due to 
globalisation; as a few of our respondents in the police and financial sector in 
reference to anti-money laundering practices said ‘we work in the same industry but 
different environment’, ‘you can’t expect everyone around the world to be the same’ 
and the more vociferous ‘the international community (meaning western interests) is 
not always right’ and ‘at times, it is if we are some backward state in need of help’.  
Since money laundering is an international problem working relationships with 
other jurisdictions in necessary if this crime is to be prevented in anyway.             
 
Conclusion   
At the start of this paper it was made clear that the aim was to highlight the problem 
of preventing money laundering in Dubai. Much has changed in a few decades with 
some nations located in the Gulf.  In the interviews it became apparent that core 
themes emerged that money laundering was a problem that needed to be dealt with, 
and that much has, and is now done, to prevent this crime. 
This paper offered anonymous employees a chance to express their views 
regarding money laundering in Dubai. These views are not necessarily representative 
of all employees or across the sector, but they offer a snap shot of professional views 
on the prevention of money laundering in Dubai from those working ‘on the inside’.   
In this way these interviews help highlight the present approach and attitude towards 
preventing money laundering in Dubai, and should be read in-conjunction with other 
developing research.       
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